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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is from a final Decree of Divorce of the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County entered on 
September 20, 1988. This Court has jurisdiction to decide the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. After a marriage into which the physician-husband 
brought an established medical practice and assets having a 
substantial value, was it equitable to exclude from the marital 
estate the value of his professional corporation, certain con-
tract rights, and retirement benefits accrued prior to the 
marriage? 
2. After exclusion of the assets described in Issue 1, was 
it equitable to divide the marital estate on an approximately 
two-thirds to one-third basis to the husband and wife, respec-
tively? 
THE GOVERNING STATUTE 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1988) provides, in 
relevant part: 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, 
the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, and 
parties. 
i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent Harold K. Dunn, M.D. ("Dr. Dunn11) and Appellant 
Connie T. Dunn ("Mrs. Dunn") were married on December 17, 1977. 
Both parties had previously been married and divorced. Dr. Dunn 
has two children from the prior marriage. 
At the time of the marriage, Dr. Dunn was 40 years old, had 
practiced as an orthopedic surgeon for fourteen years, and was 
earning approximately $71,000.00 per year. At the time of the 
marriage, Mrs. Dunn was 27 years old, employed as a medical 
secretary, and was earning approximately $14,400.00 per year. 
Mrs. Dunn ceased working outside the home in 1979 and contributed 
little or no income to the marriage thereafter. 
Dr. Dunn brought property into the marriage with a value in 
excess of $423,000.00. The property included a condominium, a 
278 acre ranch in Idaho, a Porsche automobile, an airplane, an 
established medical practice and accrued retirement benefits. 
Mrs. Dunn brought an automobile with a value of $2,100.00 into 
the marriage. 
The parties were separated on October 2, 1986, after less 
than nine years of marriage. Mrs. Dunn filed a Complaint for 
divorce on December 3, 1986. 
The case was tried on May 11 and 12, 1988, with closing 
arguments presented on May 16, 1988. On May 26, 1988, the 
District Court entered its Memorandum Decision. On June 10, 
1988, Mrs. Dunn filed a Mot ion for Reconsideration and 
Clarification of Memorandum Decision. The District Court denied 
the Motion by Order entered September 7, 1988. On September 20, 
1988, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. Mrs. Dunn filed her 
Notice of Appeal on October 19, 1988. 
In the Decree of Divorce, the District Court awarded assets 
with a value of approximately $262,000.00, or 38X of the marital 
estate, to Mrs. Dunn. Dr. Dunn was awarded assets with a value 
of approximately $437,000.00, or 62% of the marital estate. Mrs. 
Dunn was also awarded alimony in the amount of $3,000.00 per 
month for a period of three years. Dr. Dunn was ordered to 
maintain and pay for health insurance and life insurance for the 
benefit of Mrs. Dunn. The parties were ordered to pay their own 
attorney's fees and costs. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. The Parties' Circumstances At The Time Of The Marriage. 
At the time of the marriage, Mrs. Dunn was 27 years old, 
held an Associate Degree from the Stevens Henegar Business 
School, and worked full-time as a medical secretary. Mrs. Dunn 
had been previously married and divorced. Mrs. Dunn brought an 
automobile worth $2,100.00 into the marriage. At the time, she 
was earning approximately $14,400.00 per year as a medical 
secretary. R000206-09, R000242 at 113, 144-45, 148-149, 155, 
Trial Exhibit D-25. 
At the time of marriage, Dr. Dunn was 40 years old, had been 
previously married for seventeen years and had two children. Dr. 
Dunn held an M.D. Degree and had practiced as an orthopedic 
surgeon for fourteen years. Dr. Dunn earned approximately 
$71,000.00 in 1977. Trial Exhibit D-22, R000242 at 149. 
At the time of marriage, Dr. Dunn was also an associate 
professor at the University of Utah School of Medicine, and was 
affiliated with the Shriner's Hospital. Dr. Dunn specialized 
then, as he does today, in total knee and hip replacements as 
well as spinal surgery. In addition, Dr. Dunn was a member of 
the American Orthopedic Association, Western Orthopedic Associa-
tion, American Medical Association, Association of Bone and Joint 
Surgeons, Scoliosis Research Society, and other professional 
organizations. R000241 at 5, 13, and 16. Trial Exhibit D-22. 
R000242 at 14, 152. 
By the time of his marriage to Mrs. Dunn, Dr. Dunn had also 
designed and developed surgical tools and techniques, published 
numerous articles, performed consulting work for private 
companies, and held visiting professorships. R000242 at 153, 
R000241 at 9-15, Trial Exhibit D-22. 
In addition to his education, knowledge, skills, and sub-
stantial earning capacity, Dr. Dunn brought a substantial amount 
of property into the marriage. The property included net equity 
in a ranch of $230,360.00, a 1974 Porsche worth $8,700.00, an 
airplane worth $26,000.00, accrued retirement benefits of 
$37,083.00, net equity of $22,493.00 in a condominium, and an 
established medical practice. Trial Exhibit D-25, R000241 at 
16-18. 
B. The Parties' Contributions To The Marriage. 
During the marriage, Dr. Dunn worked approximately 60 to 70 
hours per week continuing a pattern he had established prior to 
the marriage. Dr. Dunn also traveled 40 to 50 days per year in 
connection with various professional activities. Trial Exhibit 
D-22, R000241 at 14-20, R000242 at 152-53. 
In 1980, Dr. Dunn became a full professor at the University 
of Utah Medical School and Chairman of the Department of Ortho-
pedic Surgery in 1981. Dr. Dunn continued to serve on profes-
sional committees and was appointed to board and officer 
positions in the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons and 
other organizations. In 1983, he was appointed to the twelve-
member board of the American Board of Orthopedic Surgery. 
R000242 at 14, Trial Exhibit D-22. 
During the marriage, Dr. Dunn continued to develop new 
orthopedic products and techniques. Dr. Dunn and another doctor 
perfected the design of surgical instruments for the implantation 
of an artificial knee known as the Miller-Galante knee. On 
December 1, 1985, Dr. Dunn entered into an agreement with Zimmer, 
Inc. (IfZimmer11) in which he agreed to license the surgical 
instruments for use and sale (the "License Agreement"). Pursuant 
to his understanding of the terms of the License Agreement, Dr. 
Dunn also agreed to provide personal consulting services to 
Zimmer to enhance the use and sale of the instruments in exchange 
for fixed royalty payments. R000242 at 40-43, 47, R000211, 
Trial Exhibit P-4. 
Dr. Dunn subsequently entered into two other license agree-
ments with Zimmer. Both of these agreements explicitly stated 
that Dr. Dunn's royalty payments were contingent upon providing 
future personal consulting services to Zimmer. Trial Exhibits 
P-5 and P-6. To meet his obligations under the License Agreement 
and the other two license agreements, Dr. Dunn traveled exten-
sively. Dr. Dunn estimated that three-fourths of the travel was 
directly related to the License Agreement. R000242 at 41-43, 47. 
Mrs. Dunn decided to forego the use of her education and 
skills by terminating her employment as a medical secretary in 
1979. Thereafter, Mrs. Dunn managed the parties' domestic 
affairs including overseeing the construction and furnishing of a 
new home. Mrs. Dunn's duties did not include the rearing of 
children since the Dunns were unable to have children. R000242 
at 113-14, 117-18, 155, 160-61. 
After Dr. Dunn's medical practice was incorporated in 1981, 
Mrs. Dunn performed bookkeeping functions for the professional 
corporation. An accountant was retained to perform the compila-
tions and to prepare the financial statements and tax returns. 
Mrs. Dunn also assisted in the management of a family limited 
partnership and most of the parties' other personal investments. 
These duties required Mrs. Dunn to work approximately five hours 
per week. Mrs. Dunn was compensated for these services through 
I.R.A. contributions. R000242 at 10-12, 114-116, 156-59. 
Mrs. Dunn traveled with Dr. Dunn approximately twelve times 
per year to various meetings, conventions, seminars and confer-
ences in connection with Dr. Dunn's professional activities. 
Mrs. Dunn's attendance was generally not required or even neces-
sary to ensure Dr. Dunn's progression within the professional 
organizations. For one year only, Mrs. Dunn was employed as a 
secretary for the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, which 
employment required her attendance at certain meetings. Other-
wise, the trips constituted vacations for Mrs. Dunn affording her 
the opportunity to shop and lunch. R000112, R000209, R000242 at 
116, 163-166, R000241 at 21-22, 48. 
Mrs. Dunn's daily schedule was such that there was nothing 
to keep her from traveling with Dr. Dunn to the various meetings 
as she had no child-rearing duties, did not work outside the 
home, and spent only five hours per week on bookkeeping. Despite 
her light schedule and Dr. Dunn's encouragement, Mrs. Dunn 
declined to further her education during the marriage. R000242 
at 155-58, 165-66, R000241 at 22-24. 
In summary, while Mrs. Dunn's contributions to the marriage 
were not insignificant, there is no evidence that she contributed 
substantially to the financial success of the marriage. The 
District Court found that ffthe period of the marriage covered 
probably the most productive period of the Defendant's life, when 
his abilities, personal to himself, increased the greatest 
through really no contribution of the Plaintiff other than her 
being married to him." R000210. 
C. The District Court's Exclusion of the Parties1 Separate 
Assets from the Marital Estate. 
The District Court excluded as separate property the value 
of (i) the professional corporation, (ii) compensation under the 
License Agreement, (iii) a portion of Dr. Dunn's retirement 
benefits from the marital estate and (iv) other assets including 
a 274 acre ranch, a condominium, an automobile and an airplane. 
R000211-000215. 
1. The Professional Corporation. 
At the time of the marriage in 1977, Dr. Dunn had been 
practicing medicine for approximately fourteen years. For tax 
purposes, Dr. Dunn incorporated the medical practice in 1981. 
Dr. Dunn's accountant, Keith F. Barnett, C.P.A., testified that 
the net value of the professional corporation as of March 31, 
1988, was $115,845.00. The balance sheet reflected $79,000.00 in 
cash, a receivable from Dr. Dunn of $53,224.00 and furniture and 
fixtures of $13,935.00 less liabilities of $30,314.00. Trial 
Exhibit D-25, R000241 at 62-65 and R000242 at 28. 
- f t . 
The evidence established and the District Court found that 
at the time of trial there was "not any substantial goodwill in 
the Defendant's medical practice that was not there at the time 
of the parties1 marriage." R000212. Mrs. Dunn does not 
challenge that decision in this appeal. 
The evidence also established that the value of the accounts 
receivable and equipment of the medical practice were approxi-
mately the same at the time of trial and the time of the parties1 
marriage. In addition, there was no evidence presented to 
indicate that the tangible assets of the practice which Dr. Dunn 
brought into the marriage were substantially enhanced during the 
course of the marriage. To the contrary, Mrs. Dunn's own expert 
placed a value of $135,706.00 on the medical practice as of 
December 31, 1977, a value greater in amount than the $115,845.00 
value of the practice as of March 31, 1988. Upon considering the 
evidence, the District Court determined that the professional 
corporation was not a marital asset. Trial Exhibits P-17, D-25, 
R000241 at 29-30, R000213. 
2. Compensation For Personal Consulting Services Under the 
December 1, 1985, License Agreement. 
Dr. Dunn entered into the License Agreement with the under-
standing that he was required to perform future personal con-
sulting services on behalf of Zimmer. These services were to 
facilitate the design development, use and sale of the surgical 
implant instruments. For this, Dr. Dunn was to receive fixed 
royalty payments. R000242 at 40-43, 47, R000211, Trial Exhibit 
P-4. 
When Dr. Dunn and Zimmer reduced their agreement to writing, 
they neglected to include the consulting services provision. 
However, the testimony of Dr. Dunn and the course of dealings 
between Zimmer and Dr. Dunn reveal that their mutual under-
standing and intent was that Dr. Dunn was obligated to provide 
substantial consulting services under the License Agreement. 
Trial Exhibits P-4,P-5, and P-6, R000242 at 40-43, 47. 
At trial, Dr. Dunn testified that he was obligated to 
"perform, lecture, [and] travel11 in order to continue receiving 
payments under the License Agreement. R000242 at 40. It was 
standard business practice for someone in Dr. Dunn's position to 
"do a tremendous amount of traveling" in order to promote the 
instruments which he designed. R000242 at 41. Dr. Dunn believed 
that it was an implicit, if not explicit, term of the License 
Agreement that he perform substantial consulting services on 
behalf of Zimmer in addition to granting Zimmer a license to use 
and sell the instruments. R000242 at 42. 
The subsequent course of dealings between Zimmer and Dr. 
Dunn confirm Dr. Dunn's understanding. Two subsequent license 
agreements between Dr. Dunn and Zimmer make explicit the under-
standing of Dr. Dunn and Zimmer throughout the entire course of 
their dealings, that Dr. Dunn's royalty payments were contingent 
upon providing future consulting services. Those services 
consisted of enhancing the design of the products and partici-
pating in workshops and lectures. In compliance with the terms 
of all three agreements, Dr. Dunn travelled 28 days in 1987 
performing consulting services on behalf of Zimmer. Three-
fourths of that time was specifically devoted to the License 
Agreement, providing Zimmer with input and teaching other sur-
geons how to properly use the knee implant instruments. Trial 
Exhibits P-5 and P-6. R000242 at 41-43, 47, 49-53. 
In order to ensure that Dr. Dunn was adequately compensated 
for traveling approximately one month per year, Zimmer and Dr. 
Dunn negotiated and agreed to fixed "royalty" payments. If they 
had arranged for royalty payments based on a percentage of sales, 
Dr. Dunn would have risked providing substantial consulting 
services without remuneration due to the fact that Zimmer often 
gave the implant instrument away free of charge in order to 
promote the sale of the Miller-Galante knee. Without a fixed 
royalty payment, the License Agreement would have been virtually 
worthless to Dr. Dunn just as the License Agreement was virtually 
worthless to Zimmer without the continued consulting services of 
Dr. Dunn. R000242 at 49-50, R000211, Trial Exhibit P-4. 
3. Retirement Benefits. 
The District Court found that during the course of the 
parties1 marriage, Dr. Dunn accrued benefits in three different 
retirement funds: (i) the TIAA-CREF Retirement Plan; (ii) the 
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Shriner's Hospital Annuity Plan; and (iii) the Harold K. Dunn, 
M.D., A.P.C. Defined Benefit Plan and Trust. R000214-15. 
The District Court specifically found that the stipulated 
value of the benefits accrued by Dr. Dunn in the TIAA-CREF Plan 
was $21,573 at the time of the parties1 marriage, and $204,472 as 
of December 31, 1987. Based on the testimony of Dr. Dunn's 
expert witness, the District Court further found that Dr. Dunn's 
premarital interest in the TIAA-CREF Plan realized compounded 
earnings during the course of the parties' marriage at the rate 
of 122 on the TIAA contract and 15.7% on the CREF contract, and 
that the value of Dr. Dunn's interest in the TIAA-CREF Plan to be 
included in the marital estate was $119,003. R000102, 
R000214-15, Trial Exhibit 25, R000241 at 59-60. 
The District Court found that the stipulated value of the 
benefits accrued by Dr. Dunn in the Shriner's Hospital Annuity 
Plan as of February 19, 1987, was $122,016. Once again, based 
on the testimony of Dr. Dunn's expert witness, the District Court 
found that, at the time of the parties' marriage, Dr. Dunn had 
accrued benefits in the Shriner's Plan of $21,600, that Dr. 
Dunn's premarital interest in that Plan realized earnings ranging 
from 7.5% to 10.75% during the course of the marriage, and that 
the value of Dr. Dunn's interest in the Shriner's Plan to be 
included in the marital estate was $71,404. R000102, R000214-15, 
Trial Exhibit 25, R000241 at 60-61. 
The District Court also found, based upon the stipulation of 
the parties, that the value of the benefits accrued by Dr. Dunn 
in the Harold K. Dunn, M.D., A.P.C. Defined Benefit Plan and 
Trust as of March 31, 1987, was $244,054, all of which accrued 
during the marriage. R000102, R000214-215, Trial Exhibit 25 and 
R000241 at 58-59. 
In summary, the District Court found that the marital estate 
included retirement benefits valued at $244,054. Mrs. Dunn was 
awarded $80,534 of those benefits or 332. 
4. Credits Granted To The Parties For Separate Premarital 
Assets. 
The District Court awarded the following credits to Dr. Dunn 
for property brought into the marriage: 
Idaho Ranch $230,360.00 
1974 Porsche 8,700.00 
Airplane 26,000.00 
Retirement Plans (Benefits 136,081.00 
at the time of marriage and 
interest earned thereon) 
Cove Point Condominium 22,493.00 
$423,634.00 
The District Court awarded Mrs. Dunn a credit of $2,100.00 for a 
1975 Cougar automobile she brought into the marriage. R00213-21. 
D. The District Court's Award Of The Remaining Marital 
Assets To the Parties. 
After returning to each of the parties the value of the 
property brought into the marriage, the District Court awarded 
property with a value of approximately $262,713.00 to Mrs. Dunn, 
representing 3S7o of the marital estate. Dr. Dunn was awarded 
property with a value of approximately $437,088.00, representing 
62% of the marital estate. R000218-223. See Appendix 1. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In reviewing the decision of the District Court, this Court 
should not disturb the apportionment of the marital property 
unless it works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to 
indicate a clear abuse of discretion by the District Court. Mrs. 
Dunn has the burden to prove the abuse of discretion by a clear 
preponderance of the evidence. 
The property brought into the marriage by Dr. and Mrs. Dunn 
is separate property and does not constitute part of the marital 
estate. Dr. Dunn brought the assets of a medical practice into 
the marriage. At the time of divorce, Dr. Dunn had an incorpo-
rated medical practice with a value of approximately the same 
amount as the value of the unincorporated medical practice at the 
time of the marriage. The law and equity require that Dr. Dunn 
be awarded the value of the medical practice as separate 
property. 
I- " acquired the - -r^/i^r^ - <i .*yr*<*rr <.• => < 1 
the c-ighLeer vears vi study .1 ~; practice pri< * T ~«.i * " i . 'hat 
time .•". effort" culminated "^ ,T*f ^ - e ^ ^ p A freemen*" *~ - ".Lei. 
« 2." J c ,. ,, *-_ J i .*m 
extensive consulting services a:- considerate" *n for tMe uval:v 
payments t n - e i — * - ~ J —
 L [ l e License - i 
c
 l ° war,, * he a,uc ,.* ? .,i^c: se 
Agreement a- separate property. 
/ -
i > rt,L* . t.uit j ,• - < .^,w -u ., v iui4.;- require the./ 
awarded - ^eparatf • roperty, the *• 1 - ^ ^ ^ ' r ^ r ^ 
1: i-^ • ti m s • :: f tl: i 2 mar ri age ai: 1 1 tl 1 = a/ppx: eciatioi 1 i n 
value thereon during the course of tl: le marriage. 
Based upon, the factors to be consider^'' as rpr:.ire4 * 
t pot l::i 01: ime .nt .e - ,. . . 
estate . =;nd Dr. Dunn, respectively, constitutes -in 
equitable allocation of the marital estate. 
ARGUMENT 
Tli e Standard For Appellate Review. 
*- •
uriier
 v« Turner, 649 P. 2d < u 
•Supreme Court: stated: 
Although this Court may weigh _;*u wVi^ci.c^ 
and substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court in divorce actions, this Court 
will not do so lightly ard m e r e 1 ^ Vi^m.co — -
judgment may differ from that of the trial 
judge. A trial court's apportionment of 
marital property will not be disturbed unless 
it works such a manifest injustice or inequi-
ty as to indicate a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
Id. at 8 (citations omitted). 
In McCrary v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1979), the Utah 
Supreme Court clearly placed the burden for establishing such 
abuse of discretion on the party seeking reversal. The McCrary 
Court stated that 
a party seeking a reversal of the trial court 
must prove a misunderstanding or misapplica-
tion of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, or that the evidence 
clearly preponderated against the findings, 
or that such a serious inequity resulted from 
the order as to constitute an abuse of the 
trial courtfs discretion. 
Id. at 1250. The abuse of the trial court's discretion must 
be proven by a clear preponderance of the evidence. Berger v. 
Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985). 
In this case, the apportionment of the marital estate by the 
District Court does not constitute a manifest injustice toward 
Mrs. Dunn so as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion. Fur-
ther, Mrs. Dunn has failed to prove abuse of discretion by a 
clear preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the decision 
of the District Court should be affirmed. 
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Dr. Dunn spent fourteen years prior to the marriage devel-
oping his medical practice. During those fourteen years and 
approximately four years during the marriage, Dr. Dunn conducted 
his practice as a sole proprietor. In 1981, Dr. Dunn incorpo-
rated the practice for certain tax benefits. 
At the time of the divorce, the professional corporation had 
a net value of $115,845.00. The assets and liabilities of the 
professional corporation consisted of cash of $79,000.00, an 
employee receivable from Dr. Dunn of $53,224.00, equipment and 
leasehold improvements of $13,935.00 and liabilities of 
$30,314.00. 
Mrs. Dunn's expert estimated that the value of the unincor-
porated practice at the time of the marriage was $135,706.00, an 
amount in excess of the net value of $115,845.00 at the time of 
the divorce. Trial Exhibits P-17, D-25. Dr. Dunn testified that 
the accounts receivable, equipment and nature of the unincorpo-
rated practice at the time of the marriage was the same as that 
of the professional corporation at the time of the divorce. 
R000241 at 17-18, 29-30. 
Relying on Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), 
and Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987), Mrs. Dunn argues 
that the net tangible assets of Dr. Dunn's professional corpo-
ration should be included in the marital estate. Mrs. Dunn's 
reliance is misplaced. 
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Id. at 1380. 
In this case, however, the "business11 was established and 
its value actualized long before the marriage. Moreover, Mrs. 
Dunn worked only five hours per week performing bookkeeping 
activities although she did perform the majority of the domestic 
duties and, of course, Mrs. Dunn did not have child rearing 
responsibilities. 
The application of the law as set forth in Burke, 773 P.2d 
133 (Utah 1987) and Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982), 
is more appropriate to the facts of the instant case. In Burke, 
the wife inherited real property during the marriage. No 
improvements were made to the property and the parties did 
nothing to enhance its value. From the time of inheritance, the 
property increased in value solely due to inflation of real 
estate values. The Burke Court held that the husband was not 
entitled to share in the appreciation in value of the property 
particularly since he had made no contribution thereto. 7 73 P.2d 
at 135-36. 
In Preston, the wife inherited improved real property. The 
husband, who performed legal services for the decedent's estate 
for one-half the regular fee and performed legal work on the 
property, argued that he should have been awarded a one-half 
interest in the property. The Preston Court held that f![e]ven 
though the husband did some work on this property, he was not 
thereby joining his efforts in a ffamily project1 . . . . The 
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issue of vhr relative contributions of the parties. Mrs. Dunn 
has not met her burden of marshalling the evidence and demon-
strating that the evidence is so lacking that a clear and rever-
sible error is present. Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 
1278 (Utah 1987). 
2. The License Agreement. 
Mrs. Dunn also appeals the decision of the District Court 
that the License Agreement constitutes separate property. Mrs. 
Dunn correctly states the proposition of law that marital pro-
perty includes royalty rights on literary works and inventions 
derived from the creative efforts, time and skill of a party 
during the marriage. E.g., Worth v. Worth, 195 Cal. App. 3d 768, 
241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1987); Wilkins v. Stout, 588 P.2d 145 (Utah 
1978). However, these cases are not applicable to the facts of 
the instant case. 
During the approximately eighteen years of schooling, 
residency, internship, and practice prior to the marriage, Dr. 
Dunn accumulated the knowledge, skill and expertise to develop 
new orthopedic products and surgical techniques and procedures. 
By December of 1985, the then twenty-six year process had culmi-
nated in the development of the design of surgical instruments 
for the implantation of an artificial knee known as the Miller-
Galante knee. On December 1, 1985, Dr. Dunn entered into the 
License Agreement with Zimmer. Subsequently, Dr. Dunn entered 
into two other agreements with Zimmer, both of which explicitly 
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confirm the xmderstanding between Dr. Dunn and Zimmer relative to 
the License Agreement that the "royalty11 payments were contingent 
upon Dr. Dunnfs providing consulting services. R000242 at 40. 
As testified to by Dr. Dunn and as found by the Court, Dr. Dunn's 
"understanding with the 'Zimmer1 people is that he would continue 
to render these services and to travel extensively and that there 
was no way to separate the amount of service he was rendering on 
behalf of the Knee Contract as opposed to the [other contracts].ff 
R000112. The Court specifically found "that without his con-
tinued services, the knee and hip contract would be virtually 
worthless.ff R000113. 
It is well-established that compensation for personal 
services performed after the dissolution of a marriage is the 
sole property of the person providing the services. See 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-33 (Utah 1982) (if the 
right to a benefit or asset has not accured during the marriage, 
it is not subject to equitable distribution); Wilkins, 588 P.2d 
at 146 (trial court is without authority to award property to be 
acquired after the divorce decree). 
Third, Mrs. Dunn once again exalts form over substance by 
emphasizing that the compensation was reported on Dr. Dunn's tax 
returns as royalties from the sale of property. Characterizing 
the compensation as a royalty payment resulted in favorable tax 
treatment which accrued to the benefit of both Dr. and Mrs. Dunn. 
•
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evidence of the present value of the retirement plans at the time 
of trial. 
In Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1987), this 
Court stated that 
[t]the distribution of retirement benefits 
should generally be postponed until benefits 
are received or at least until the earner is 
eligible to retire. That is particularly 
true where there is a sparsity of other 
divisible assets. See Kikkert, 427 A.2d at 
80. However, the trial court retains the 
discretion to divide the retirement account 
along with other assets at the time the 
divorce is entered. If that discretion is 
exercised, the court must make specific 
findings as to reasons for immediate dis-
tribution. Such reasons might include, (for 
example), an agreement of the parties, 
imminency of retirement, retirement accounts 
not managed by a trustee, a short marriage, 
age differential of the parties, or unusual 
hostility between the parties. 
Id. at 832-3. As discussed below, the instant case is factually 
the exception referred to in Bailey where a present value 
analysis and immediate distribution are appropriate. 
First, the District Court heard evidence and made detailed 
findings regarding the value of the retirement plans at the time 
of marriage and divorce and the earnings thereon during the 
marriage. This evidence was necessary to properly consider a 
present value analysis. Second, the Dunns had a marital estate 
with sufficient divisible assets available so that an early 
distribution to Mrs. Dunn was feasible. Finally, although the 
District Court did not make specific findings as to the reasons 
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In summary, the District Court heard competent evidence to 
determine the value of the retirement plans at the time of 
marriage, the earnings thereon during the marriage and the value 
of the retirement plans at the time of divorce. The present 
value analysis performed and other facts of this case support 
immediate distribution. 
4. The Credits Granted To the Parties For Separate Assets 
Were Appropriate. 
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, Dr. Dunn brought 
identified property worth more than $423,000.00 into the mar-
riage. Mrs,, Dunn brought identified property worth $2,100.00 
into the marriage. Mrs. Dunn argues that some, but not all, of 
the credits awarded by the District Court for such property 
constitute reversible error. 'Mrs. Dunn fails to explain why she 
apparently agrees with the District Court's decision to award Dr. 
Dunn a $230,360.00 credit for the ranch in Idaho and Mrs. Dunn a 
$2,100.00 credit for the 1975 Cougar, but disagrees with the 
award of credits for other property brought into the marriage. 
More importantly, the case law is clearly contrary to Mrs. 
Dunn's contentions. First, a case directly on point is Jesperson 
v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980). In Jesperson, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
In making a property division, a court may 
properly consider such things as the length 
of the marriage and the parties' respective 
contributions to the marriage. This marriage 
lasted less than six years and no children 
issued therefrom. Plaintiff brought into the 
marriage furniture - , ^  uiw^ xxc 
a total of $22,500 in savings; defendant 
brought no assets into the marriage. In the 
decree, plaintiff was awarded the furniture, 
a car, and the purchase price of a mobile 
home, all of approximately the same value as 
those Items brought into the marriage b}7 
Plaintiff. The court specifically found that 
u[t]he purchase price of the mobile home and 
lot in issue was $19,027, which was con-
tributed from Plaintiff's separate funds . . 
•
f!
 It was not unreasonable for the court to 
permlF plaintiff to withdraw from the marital 
property the equivalent of those asse"t¥ 
plaintiff brought into the marriage. All 
that may be considered to be marital property 
acquired through the joint efforts of the 
parties was therefore the proceeds from *:he 
sale of the St. George home over and above 
its purchase price of $19,027. The 771-231 
split of the residual assets is not, under 
tne facts presented, inequitable. This is 
particularly so when viewed in light of the 
fact that it was plaintiff's financial"" 
ability alone that permitted the purchase of 
the mobile horned Except for said fact, there 
would have been no profits of sale to be 
divided. 
Id, * •> -mphasis addedi 
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venture during the marriage. Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P. 2d 
1276, 1277 (Utah 1987). 
Third, the $22,493.00 credit given to Dr. Dunn for the prom-
issory note was also in accordance with Utah law. This credit 
represents the equity of the Cove Point condominium which Dr. 
Dunn brought: into the marriage. The fact that the promissory 
note was payable to the parties jointly does not conclusively 
establish that a gift to Mrs. Dunn was intended. Jesperson, 610 
P. 2d at 328. Rather, Mrs. Dunn must show that the note was 
placed in the parties1 joint names ffin such a manner11 as to 
evidence an intent to make it marital property. Mortensen, 760 
P.2d at 307. Mrs. Dunn has not established this. 
Finally, the value of retirement plans on the date of the 
marriage constitutes separate property. Preston, 646 P.2d 705. 
Similarly, Mrs. Dunn is not entitled to share in the accrued 
interest thereon, because she has made no contribution toward the 
appreciation in value realized. Id. at 706; Burke, 733 P.2d at 
135-36. 
The fact that Dr. Dunn kept no records as to the premarital 
values and the interest accruals thereon is irrelevant in light 
of the fact that Mrs. Dunn does not, apparently, dispute the 
competency of the evidence presented by Dr. Dunn's expert in 
Trial Exhibit D-25. The values at the time of the marriage and 
the interest thereon were derived from evidence prepared by Mr. 
Barnett and the respective administrators of the plans. 
Also lacking in merit is Mrs. Dunnfs assertion that Dr. Dunn 
never indicated any intention that those accruals constituted 
separate property. The real question is whether or not Dr. Dunn 
clearly and affirmatively evidenced an intent to treat such 
separate property as marital property. Mortensen, 760 P. 2d at 
307. 
In summary, the credits granted to the parties for separate 
assets brought into the marriage were appropriate and equitable. 
C. The Marital Estate Was Apportioned On an Equitable 
Basis. 
In Turner v. Turner, the Utah Supreme Court noted that 
f,[t]here is no fixed rule or formula for the distribution of a 
marital estate." 649 P.2d at 8. Mathematical inequality "is 
not sufficient grounds to constitute an abuse of discretion, 
since a fair and equitable property distribution is not neces-
sarily an equal distribution." Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 
789 (Utah App. 1987). The duty of the court is "to make a 
division of the property and income in a divorce proceeding so 
that the parties may readjust their lives to the new situation as 
well as possible." Id. 
The Turner Court noted numerous factors which should be 
considered in adjusting the rights and obligations of the 
parties. 
They include: the respective ages of the 
parties; what each may have given up for the 
marriage; what money or property each put 
into the marriage; the physical and mental 
_Q1 
health of the parties; the relative ability, 
training and education of the parties; the 
duration of the marriage; the present income 
of the parties; the efforts exerted by the 
parties in acquiring marital property; the 
present mental and physical age of the 
parties; the life expectancy of the parties; 
the ability of the wife to provide income for 
herself; and the ability of the husband to 
provide support. 
Id. at 8. The following factors are also relevant in the instant 
case: the standard of living of each party before the marriage, 
the number and age of the children reared, and the happiness and 
pleasure, or lack thereof, experienced during the marriage. 
MacDonald, 236 P.2d at 1070. 
Applying the factors set forth in Turner and MacDonald, the 
38% to 62% division is equitable. First, Dr. Dunn, age 50, is 
thirteen years older than Mrs. Dunn, age 37. Mrs. Dunn will have 
the opportunity to work thirteen years after Dr. Dunn retires. 
Additionally, due to his occupation as a surgeon, Dr. Dunn may 
have to retire at a younger age than Mrs. Dunn. 
Second, neither party gave up substantial opportunities to 
enter into the marriage. Dr. Dunn was already an established 
surgeon. Dr. Dunn's earning capacity actually allowed Mrs. Dunn 
to terminate her full-time employment and enjoy a life style she 
would never have achieved or enjoyed on her own. Even during the 
marriage, however, Dr. Dunn encouraged Mrs. Dunn to complete her 
education. 
Third, Dr. Dunn brought money and property in excess of 
$423,000.00 into the marriage, but Mrs. Dunn brought only an 
automobile worth $2,100.00. This factor should bear heavily on 
the property received at the termination of the marriage. 
Fourth, both parties are able-bodied and suffer no con-
ditions which would impair their income producing capacity and 
ability to support themselves. 
Fifth, Dr. Dunn brought a medical degree and fourteen years 
of practice as a surgeon into the marriage. He also brought 
academic and professional appointments and the knowledge and 
skill to perfect the design of surgical instruments. Mrs. Dunn 
brought a two-year associates degree and training as a medical 
secretary. 
Sixth, the parties were married on December 17, 1977, and 
the Decree of Divorce was entered September 30, 1988, a marriage 
of less than 11 years. The parties were separated for 
approximately the last two years of the marriage. The marriage 
was of nominal length. 
Seventh, Dr. Dunn brought into the marriage a substantial 
income of $71,000.00. Dr. Dunn's income has continued to in-
crease, rising to $357,889.00 in 1987. Both Dr. and Mrs. Dunn 
enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle made possible by Dr. Dunn's 
income. Mrs. Dunn brought a modest income into the marriage but 
is now pursuing a graduate degree which will provide her with 
sufficient income to comfortably support herself. 
In fact, Mrs. Dunn herself testified that the amount of 
$200,000.00 would be sufficient to "cover expenses" allowing her 
to get through school and earn an income sufficient to support 
herself. R000242 at 139-140. Mrs. Dunn has already been awarded 
more than this amount by the District Court. 
Eighth, at the time of marriage the parties had extremely 
disparate standards of living. It would be inequitable if those 
standards of living are now completely equalized. 
Ninth, the parties had no children and thus the responsibil-
ities associated therewith are not present in the instant case. 
Tenth, the effort exerted and contribution made by Dr. Dunn 
toward the acquisition of marital property exceeded that by Mrs. 
Dunn. Dr. Dunn labored for 60 to 70 hours per week and traveled 
extensively. Mrs. Dunn worked 5 hours per week, took care of the 
domestic responsibilities and frequently vacationed during Dr. 
Dunn's professional travel. 
Finally, Mrs. Dunn attempts to distort the percentage of the 
marital estate she was awarded by inflating the value of the 
marital estate by not recognizing the credits for premarital 
assets awarded to Dr. Dunn. Properly recognizing the credits 
results in a 38% to 62% division as compared to the 24% to 76% 
distorted division presented by Mrs. Dunn. See Appendix 1. 
Considering these factors, the 38% to 62% division of the 
marital estate was equitable and should be affirmed. 
D. The Lifestyle Enjoyed By The Parties Was An Appropriate 
Factor To Be Considered By The Court. 
Mrs. Dunn finally argues that the fact that she enjoyed a 
standard of living beyond her own earning capacity during the 
marriage was not a permissible ground for the District Court to 
apportion the marital property as it did. Mrs. Dunn's argument 
is misplaced on several grounds. 
First, the standard of living was not the sole factor 
considered by the Court. As evidenced by its findings, the 
District Court considered all of the relevant factors. 
Second, the lifestyle enjoyed by the parties is an appro-
priate factor to consider in setting alimony as well as making 
property distributions. In Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 
237 (Utah App. 1987), this Court stated: 
In cases like the instant one, life patterns 
have largely been set, the earning potential 
of both parties can be predicted with some 
reliability, and the contributions and 
sacrifices of the one spouse in enabling the 
other to attain a degree have been compen-
sated by many years of the comfortable 
lifestyle which the degree permitted. 
Id. at 242 n.4. 
In the instant case, however, no contribution or sacrifice 
was made by Mrs. Dunn which allowed Dr. Dunn to obtain the degree 
or establish his earning capacity. Accordingly, an unequal 
although equitable distribution of the marital estate was made. 
Similar distributions have been approved by the Utah Supreme 
Court in numerous cases. See, e.g., Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (wife 
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received somewhere between 27% and 42% of marital assets); 
Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (husband received 40%); Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 
994 (Utah 1975) (wife received 33%)- Other jurisdictions have 
approved unequal but equitable distributions based on similar 
facts. See, e.g. Whispell v. Whispell, 534 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1988) 
(11.5% to husband who earned little income, did not sacrifice 
opportunities to maintain household, raised no children, and 
enjoyed a high standard of living during marriage); McKee-Johnson 
v. Johnson, 429 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. App. 1988) (40% to wife where 
court recognized the husband's expertise in increasing the 
partiesf wealth). 
Finally, assuming arguendo that the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage is an improper factor under Utah law 
to consider in making a property distribution, the District 
Court's decision can still be affirmed on the basis of the other 
properly considered factors as discussed above. Jesperson, 610 
P.2d at 328. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the apportionment of the marital 
estate by the District Court was equitable and, accordingly, the 
Decree of Divorce should be affirmed. 
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APPENDIX I 
Mrs. Dunn Dr. Dunn Total 
Note 1 
Credits for: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Automobiles 
Airplane 
Roberson Contract 
License Agreement 
Profesional 
Corporation 
264,813 
(2,100) 
262,713 
or 38% 
839,098 
( 8,700) 
(22,400) 
(22,493) 
(232,572) 
(115,845) 
437,088 
or 627. 
1,103,911 
(10,800) 
(22,400) 
(22,493) 
(232,572) 
(115,845) 
699,801 
Note 1 - Total property distribution per Appendix 1 of Brief of 
Appellant• 
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